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ABSTRACT
Following Bertola and Caballero (1991), we document an empirica! puzzle jor EMS ezchange
rates during a period in which these exchanges rates were (almostJ credible, i.e. exchange rate
distributions are hump-shaped rather than U-shaped as predicled by the standard target zone model. We
offer an explanation which is based on the combination ojtwo realistic jeatures, namely the presence oj
intramarginal interventions and wagelprice sluggishness.
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The seminal paper of Krugman (1991) was the first to explicitly analyse the effects of exchange
rate bands on exchange rate behaviour. However, as a modeling vehicle for the European Monetary
System (EMS), [here is strong evidence that it fails [o account for a number of stylised facts, of which the
most important is the evidence on the empirical distributions of most EMS exchange rates in their bands.
These unconditional distributions tend in practice to be hump-shaped, with most of the probability mass
concentrated inside the band, while theory predicts on the basis of the Krugman (1991) model that these
distributions should be U-shaped, i.e. with a large concentration of probability mass close to the bound-
aries (see Svensson, 1991a). For example, Bertola and Caballero (1992) present empirical evidence about
the hump-shaped feature of the distribution of the French franc against the Deuuche Mark (the FfrIDM
rate) for the period April 1979 - December 1987. They offer an explanation which is based on repeated
realignments of the exchange rate and also provide empirical evidence on interest rate differentials, which
at times indicate expectations of future realignments.
We argue, however, that for the Netherlands, for the period April 1983 - November 1991, and for
the other EMS countries, for the period February 1987 - November 1991, offshore interest differentials
with Germany show quite a different pattem. On average, they have decreased dramatically compared to
the preceding period, indicating a strong increase in the credibility of the exchange rate bands. Still, the
empirical distributions of the exchange rates against the Deutsche Mark continue to be hump-shaped. This
is, in particular, the case for the Dutch guilder against the Deutsche Mark (DfVDM), which is generally
considered as the most credible exchange rate in the EMS. The reason for choosing these particulaz
sample periods is that they are prolonged periods in which realignments did not occur', and it was
generally believed that the exchange rate bands were becoming more and more credible. This belief was
expressed by statements of EMS govemments never to devalue again and by the progress on plans for a
Economic Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) (e.g., the Delors Committee). Our period of investigation
ends just prior to the Maastricht Summit in December 1991', because it was precisely at this moment,
when criteria were negotiated for participation in an EMU, that doubts rose about the eligibility of a
number of countries to participate in an EMU. These doubts were reinforced by political difficulties in the
ratifiwtion of the Maastricht Treaty (wimess the Danish vote) and the recent successful speculative
attacks on the Italian lira and pound sterling. There is thus a potential danger that the whole Treaty,
including the agreements on an EMU, will never be ratified.
It is thus not clear that the explanation of the hump-shaped feature of unconditional exchange rate
distributions offered by Bertola and Caballero (1992) is appropriate for the sample periods that we
consider, mainly because the anticipation of repeated realignments did not scem to be much of an issue
prior to Maastricht. We offer therefore an altemative and realistic explanation of the observed hump-
' Except for a change in the central parity of the Italian lira on January 8, 1990. However, this was a
special case, because it occurred when the band width of the lira was reduced from t6"~o to t2.25"~0.
Z Even though the Dfl~DM rate does not show any qualitative difference in behaviour for the period
after that.z
shaped distribution of the exchange rates, which is based on the presence of intramarginal interventions
(i.e. monetary accommodation within the band). See Giavaai and Giovannini (19g9) for a discussion of
the empirical relevance of intramarginal intervention during earlier periods of the EMS'. To have an
interesting role for intramarginal interventions, we allow for transitory unemployment caused by nominal
price and wage inertia. Our analysis is conducted within the context of a stochastic version of the
Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model, following the Miller and Weller (1990) extension of Krugman
(1991), with shocks to aggregate supply. Hence, three realistic features are added to the Krugman (1991)
modeL (i) home and foreign products are imperfect substitutes in consumption so that purchasing power
parity is relaxed, (ii) prices and wages are sluggish, and (iii) there are intramarginal as well as
inframarginal (i.e., at the edges of the band) interventions in the foreign exchange market'. Most of the
existing work on nominal exchange rate bands lacks these features. Many studies, for example, assume
purchasing power parity'. If there is a unique relazionship between the exchange rate withín the band and
its fundamental, there are two factors contributing to the explanazion of the hump-shaped feature of the
exchange rate distribution: the shape of the exchange raze solution in terms of the fundamental (on which
the explanation of Bertola aztd Caballero (1992) is based`), and mean-reversion in the fundamental. Our
proposed explanation is based on a combínation of both these factors'. 7tte objextive of this paper is thus
' Lewis (1990) analyses a specific type of intramarginal intervention (i.e. at each point in time there is
a non-zero probability that the Brownian motion of the fundamental is stopped) within the context of a
monetary model with purchasing power parity and full employment.
` Apart from being based on more realistic features, i.e. price sluggishness and intramarginal
intervention, this way of modeling has other advantages as well. The presence of sluggish prices and,
therefore, of temporary unemployment, allows one to study the trade-off between price variability and
variability of employment under an exchange rate band (see Beetsma and van der Plceg, 1992). Moreover,
if one allows for imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, one can study the effects of a
band on the real exchange rate (see also Miller and Weller, 1990, 1991).
' Krugman's (1991) minimalist stochastic specification can be derived from a monetary model of
exchange rates where purchasing power parity and full employment prevails (e.g., Froot and Obstfeld,
1991; Svensson, 199Ia). However, it can also be interpreted as the reduced form of a target zone model
with imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods and an upward-sloping aggregate supply
schedule (see Sutherland, 1992b).
" Bertola and Caballero (1992) show that if realignment risk is strong enough, the standard S-shaped
exchange rate solution turns into an inverted S-shape which is stceper near the boundaries than around the
central parity. With a process for the fundamental, which is (conditional on the money supply) wifotmly
distributed in its band, this leads to a concentration of the probability mass of the exchange rate around its
central parity.
' Lindberg and Siiderlind (1992) allow for repeazed realignments and mean-reverting intramarginal
interventions and generate a hump-shaped pattern for the exchange rate distribution as well. The
disadvantage of their model is that it assumes purchasing power parity and that net cumulated
interventions will be non-stationary (due to velocity being Brownian motion). In our analysis, even though
cumulative interventions can reach any level with positive probability, the global stability of the model
cnsures that txirrowed reserves can always be paid off in the future. Delgado and Dumas (1991) introduce
mean-reversion in the uncontrollable part of [he fundamental. The difference with Lindberg and Sbderlind3
to show that mean-reversion introduced by sluggish adjustment of prices and wages combined with a
degree of intramarginal intervention can result in a hump-shaped exchange rate distribution and thereby
explain the empirical evidence. We show that the hump-shape is more likely to occur when the degree of
monetary accommodation is close to what is needed to peg the nominal exchange rate (so that the
fundamental has to move far away from its mean for the exchange rate to reach its boundaries). We thus
argue that hump-shaped distributíon functions for EMS exchange rates may be due to EMS countries
engaging in intramarginal as well as infrarnarginal interventions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we document the empirical puzzle. Seaion
3 presents our model. fn section 4, we first consider, as a benchmark for comparison, the case of an
unrestricted dirty float without a nominal exchange rate band. In section 5, we analyse the effects of a
nominal exchange rate band. In section 6 we explain how the hump-shaped feature of exchange rate
distributions can be reproduced and provide an illustration based on Monte Carlo simulations. In section 7
we summarise the results and offer sugges[ions for further research.
2. Empirical evidence for EMS exchange ntes
As already mentioned in the previous section, we will study the EMS exchange rates against the
Deutsche Mark for the subperiod February 1987 - November 1991. However, we study the DFlIDM rate
for a somewhat longer period, i.e. April 1983 - November 1991.
Figures I(a) and 1(b) show one-month offshore interest rate differentials` against the position of
the French frandDeutsche Mark (FfrIDM) rate in its band for the subperiods March 1979 - January 1987
and February 1987 - November 1991, respectively. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) do the same for the DflIDM rate
for the subperiods March 1979 - March 1983 and April 1983 - November 1991, respectively. 7he area
between the pairs of diagonal lines is the set of combinations of exchange rate position in the band and
interest rate differential for which the predicted future exchange tate does not lie outside the current band,
i.e. under the assumption of uncovered interest parity the sum of the interest tate differential plus the
deviation of the current exchange rate from central parity must be within the t2.25"~0 or ttí"Io band. Going
from the early EMS to the more recent EMS subperiod, for both countries interest rate differentials with
Germany have decreased dramatically on average. In fact, this effect is even s[ronger (although not visible
(1992) is that the mean of the mean-reverting fundamental process shifts (in the opposite direction of the
movement of the uncontrollable part of the fundamental) when intervention takes place. Hence, the
relationship between fundamental and exchange ra[e in the band is non-unique. The implications for Ihe
unconditional exchange rate distribution still need to be worked out. For narrow bands, it might well be
the case that the tendency for mean reversion is so strong, if net accumulated interventions aro nonzero,
that, for most of the time, the exchange rate settles near the edges of its band, which would result in a U-
shaped unconditional exchange rate distribution (a similar reasoning applies to the Miller and Weller,
1991, model with continuous interventions at the boundaries; see foomo[e IS).
" We use daily observations. Interest rate differentials are computed from spot and forward exchange
rates under the assumption of covered interest parity.4
in the figures) towards the end of the more recent EMS subperiod. For the other EMS countries the
pattern of change of interest rate differentials is similar (the corresponding figures have been omitted to
save space). The second outstanding feature for France is that the positive correlation between the
posi[ion of [he nominal exchange rate in the band and the interest rate differential, which is clearly
present during the early EMS subperiod (as is also reported by Bertola and Caballero, 1992), has vanished
during the more recent EMS period. For other countries we have been unable to detect a clear correlation
between the interest rate differential and the exchange rate position for either of the two EMS subperiods.
Figures 3 and 4 show, for the more recent EMS subperiods, kernel estimates of the unconditional
densi[y func[ions of [he FfrIDM and DflIDM rate, respectively, in their bands`. Both estimates clearly
indicate a concentration of probability mass in the interior of the band. Although not shown here, other
EMS exchange rates show a pattern for the unconditional exchange rate density function which is roughly
similar. Hence, despite the fact that interest rate differentials have largely been eliminated during the more
recent EMS subperiod thus indica[ing a significant decrease in devaluation risk, the hump-shaped pattem
of the empirical distributions of the EMS exchange rates in their bands continues to be present, both
during the early and the more recent EMS subperiods. This suggests that the explanation offered by
Bertola and Caballero (1992) might be less relevant for the more recent EMS subperiod (April 1983 -
November 1991 for the DflIDM, February 1987 - November 1991 for the other exchange rates).
3. Transitory unemployment in a small open economy
Most of the existing work on nominal exchange rate bands is based on Krugman (1991), and
adopts the unrealistic assumptions of purchasing power parity and fully Flexible wages and prices, and
thus assumes full employment. Notable exceptions are Miller and Weller (199Q 1991), who extend
Krugman (199I) to a stochastic version of the familiar exchange rate overshooting model of Dombusch
(1976), thus allowing for sluggish price movements and imperfect substitution between home and foreign
goods in consumption. Our model of a small open economy extends Miller and Weller (1990) to allow for
different types of nominal exchange rate regimes, each one of them characterised by a particular feedback
rule for the money supply. ln particular, in section 4, when we introduce a nominal exchange rate band,
we extend Miller and Weller (1990) by allowing for intramarginal accommodation and intervention in the
foreign exchange market. Our model may be summarised by the following equations:
Y--ní7-n)fs(etP~-P), n~(I,O~S~I
m-P-Y-ir, U(1




" The choice of the kemel was based on the standardnormal density function, while the choice of the
window width was based on minimizing the mean integrated square ertor (e.g., see Silverman, 1986).5
E,(de) - (i - i') dt (3.4)
m - m(pj (3.5)
where m, y, y", p, p, e and dc denote logarithms of the nominal money supply, the level of aggregate
demand, the full-employment level of output, the home price level, the foreign price level, the nominal
exchange rate (price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency units) and a supply
shock, respectively, i and i denote the home and foreign nominal interest rate, respectively, and a denotes
the rate ofcore inflation.
The home country specialises in the production of a good with price p and the foreign country
specialises in the production of a good with price p'. There is imperfect substitution between home and
foreign goods. Equation (3.1) is [he IS-curve and shows that aggregate demand increases when the real
interest rate declines or the real exchange rate depreciates. The real interest rate is simply the nominal
interest rate minus the core inflation rate. Equation (3.2) is the LM-curve and says that the velocity of
circulation increases with the nominal interest rete. Equation (3.3) is the Phillips-curve, which shows that
infla[ion in wages and producer prices occurs when there is excessive demand for goods, and that deflati-
on occurs when there is unemployment. The speed az which the labour market clears, i.e the degree of
price and wage flexibiliry, corresponds to the parameter ~. For convenience, the full-employment level of
output is assumed to equal ~i' (i.e. y~-~i')'o. Supply shocks (z) follow a Brownian motion and cor-
respond to positive shocks to nominal wages; z follows an independent Wiener process with zero mean
and instantaneous standard deviation equal to a. Producer prices are a constant mark-up on unit labour
costs, so that supply shocks may be interpreted as negative shocks to labour productivity. The money
supply is stable in steady state, so core inflation (n) being the trend rate of inflation is zero". Equation
(3.4) is the uncovered interest parity condition. Risk-neutral arbitrage ensures that an interest differential
in favour of the domestic country can only be sustained if the currency is expected to depreciate in the
future, i.e. if the currency is currently over-valued. Finally, equation (3.5) ís the feedback rule for money
supply in response to price changes. AIl exchange rate regimes considered in the sequel are characterised
by a special case of this feedback rule for monetary policy.
'o This guarantees that in steady state, i.e. when the expected change in the price level and the
exchange rate is zero, nominal money supply and the price level are both equal to p[see equation (4.1)].
It also ensures that, if there is full monetary accommodation, i.e. a PPP exchange rate rule (see section
4.2), the real exchange ra[e is pegged, other real variables are constant as well, and expected price and
nominal interest rate changes are zero.
" The advantage of this simple specification is that one can unambiguously determine that the system
is saddlepath stable. If aggregate demand depends on the real consumption interest rate, i.e. the nominal
interest rate minus the rational expected rate of change in the CPI, there is a possibility of an unstable
spiral (i.e. higher inflation depresses the real interest rate, boosts aggregate demand and thus induces even
higher inflation). Our definition of core inflation in the definition of the real interest rate avoids these
indeterminacies and simplifies Ihe algebra.6
4. Unrestricted dirty float: The case of no band on the exchange rate
To facilitate comparison with a regime in which an exchange rate band is present, we first
consider the case of an unrestricted dirty float. Hence, there is no exchange rate band and the money
supply rule is linear:
m-t~ta(P-N)-(I-a)IttaP, a~l. (4.1)
This feedback rule says that, when prices exceed their long-run value p(i.e. the exogeneous component of
the money supply), the monetary authorities accommodate and raise the money supply. The degree of
monetary accommodation is given by the ccefficient (i.
For simplicity, and without any loss of generality, we normalise all foreign variables [o uro.
Alternatively, we could redefine all domestic variables as deviations from their steady state. Using (4.1),
the reduced form equations of the model under a dirty float are given by:
dP - 0(Tlt~)-'i-[S~tT1(1-D)jp~S)ve-~Tl(I-P)p}dt f adz (4.2)
E,de -(Tlt~)'](I-p-S) P t S e-(1-a) N] dt. (4.3)
The price level is a predetermined, backward-looking variable, whilst the exchange rate is a non-
predetermined, forward-looking variable which jumps if private agents suddenly anticipate a change in
future policy. The rational expectations equilibrium must therefore be a stable saddlepath solution. This
requires one eigenvalue with a negative real part and one eigenvalue with a positive real part, which is
ensured as long as ji~l holds. To find the unique, non-explosive razional expectations solution, we postu-
late a linear saddlepath:
e- mean(e) - m jp - mean(p)] (4.4)





In fact, there is another solution for tu as well. However, that solution can be ruled out because it does
not satisfy the requirement that the adjustment of prices along the saddlepath is a stable process.
The slope m of the saddlepath increases if the ccefficient of monetary accommodation ((3)7
increases". For low degrees of monetary accommodation, i.e. p~l-S, there is a negative cortelation
between the nominal exchange rate and the price level, i.e. the saddlepath slopes downwards. This implies
that the nominal exchange rate overshoots in response to an unanticipated and permanent change in the
long-run muney supply (cf, Dombusch, 1976). For high degrees of monetary accommodation, I-S~Q~1,
the saddlepath slopes upwards, which implies undershooting of the nominal exchange rate. The tuming
point between overshooting and undershooting of the nominal exchange rate in response to an
unanticipated permanent change in [he money supply corresponds to the ccefficient of monetary
accommodation that ensures a fixed nominal exchange rate (i.e. (i-1-S), so that w~. This nominal
exchange rate regime will be referred to as a peg.
It is easy to see that for p~l-S, w is increasing in ~, while for 1-S~(3~1, w is decreasing in ~.
Therefore, az~ increases, the relationship between w and p pivots around the peg (ji-1-S) towards the
horizontal axis. In the extreme case of a clazsical model with full employment (i.e. ~-~oo), w~0 and all
transitional dynamics disappear.
4J. Specia! case. fixed exchange ~ates
Under a peg the monetary authorities use unsterilised interventions to fix the exchange rate. If the
foreign interest rate exceeds the domestic interest rate, there is an incipient capital outflow and pressure
tbr the currency to depreciate. Under a peg, the central bank defends the exchange rate by selling foreign
reserves and buying its own currency. As a result, the money supply falls until the domestic interest rate
is pushed up to the level of the foreign interest rate. Hence, a peg corresponding to e-e, implies that the
domestic interest rate is anchored to the foreign interest rate, and that an independent domestic monetary
policy is infeasible:
m-(I-S)PtSer-a(P-W)tlt. (4.6)
Hence, a peg at e-e, corresponds to a very specific (linear) money supply rule, namely an accommodation
ccefficient of (i-1-S and a long-run component of the money supply of p-eP. Upon substitution of these
results in (4.2), we find that prices follow an Omstein-Uhlenbeck process (Karlin and Taylor, 1981,
p.172):
dp--~S(p-er)dttadz (4.7)
which is a mean-reverting process. Clearly, the asymptotic mean of this process is mean(p~ft-eP. The
expected spced of inean-reversion towards the steady state increazes while the variances of output and
prices (i.e. var(y)-S'var(p)-~áa'Sl~) decrease with the degree of labour market Flexibility (ra). In a
12 If (i-1-S, then w~. If (1-l and ~~Sl, then w-1. If p~ and S2~á, w~-I.s
classical world in which markets clear instanteneously the variances of output and prices are uro. If
aggregate demand is more sensitive to relative prices (higher S), the variance of output is higher but the
variance of the price level is lower. The variance of inFlation over the unit interval (say, ~p) is given by
var(Ap)-2[I-exp(-~b)]var(p). Full employment (~-~oo) implies that both the variance of the price level and
of the inFlation rate are zero.
4.2. Clean float versus PPP exchange rate rule
Other special cases are zero monetary accommodation (a-0), which will be referred to as a clesn
tloat and inter alia always implies exchange rate overshooting, and, at the other extreme, full
accommodation (p-1). Under a clean float the monetary authorities do not give in to wage and price
demands and thus keep the nominal money supply fixed, while with full accommodation they accommo-
date all wage and price shocks. It is easy to see that in the latter case all transitional dynamics are elimin-
ated and that the real exchange rate is fixed at zero. Hence, 100"~o monetary accommodation corresponds
to a rule which ensures that the domestic interest rate is pegged to the foreign interest rate, that the real
exchange rate is fixed (p'te-p-0) and thus that employment and output are at their natural rates. This
special case ((i-1) is also referted to as a PPP exchange rate rvle (e.g. Dombusch, 1982; Alogoskoufis,
1991)", and induces non-stationarity in the nominal price level and exchange rate (var{p), var(e) ~ oo).
4.3. Unrestricted dirty Jloat
More general degrees of monetary accommodation correspond to a situation in which deviations
of prices from their steady state are partially accommodated (0~(i~l-S or 1-S~p~l) and will be termed an
unrestricted dirty 11oat. The exchange rate adjusts instantaneously to ensure equilibrium on the balance
of payments, but nevertheless some inttamarginal intervention in the foreign exchange market occurs.
The steady staze corresponds to the mean of the asymptotic distributions. In the long run relazive
purchasing power parity holds and money is neutral, independent of the monetary accommodation
ccefficicnt ((f). However, in the short run the qualitative properties of the rational expectations equilibrium
depend very much on the ccefficient of monetary at.commodation (p). An increase in the exogeneous or
long-run component of the money supply (p) induces overshooting (cf, Dornbusch, 1976) of the
exchange rate for low degrees of accommodation ((i~l-S). The market expects an interest raze differential
in favour of abroad and thus over time a gradually appreciating exchange rate, so that the exchange rate
must on impact over-react. However, for large ccefTcients of monetary accommodation (I-S~(S~I), the
exchange rate undershoots on impact. A gradual increase in prices is accompanied by a gradual expansion
" A higher degree of nominal exchange rate indexazion gives more stability in the real exchange rate
and the levels of demand and employment, but on the other hand it amplifies the effects of wage
disturbances and other supply shocks on prices. Alogoskoufis (1991) extends Dornbusch (1982) by
highlighting the effects of monetary and exchange rate accommodation on the forward-looking behaviour
of wage- and price-setters, and suggests that more persistence in inflation may arise from a higher degree
of accommodation in floating exchange rate regimes.9
of the money supply, so that the anticipated gradual rise in interest rates is less pronounced. Consequent-
ly, the exchange rate depreciates less and the interest rate falls less on impact thus leading to
undershooting rather than overshooting ofthe exchange ra[e.
5. Dirty tloat with a nominal exchange rate band
As already mentioned, one of the crucial elements in the explanation of the observed hump-
shaped distributions of EMS exchange rates within a nominal exchange rate band is the presence of
intramarginal interventions in the foreign exchange market. Hence, below we introduce a band on the
exchange rate and to capture the presence of intramarginal interventions we allow for a non-uro
coefficient of monetary accommodation (p), cf the rule (4.1), if the exchange rate is inside the band. We
assume, for ease of notation, that the long-run component of the money supply is uro (i.e. p~). In order
to solve for the exchange rate solution within its band, we postulate instead of the linear saddlepath
solution (4.4) a twice differentiable function for the solution:
e - S2 (p). (4.4')
Use of Ito's Lcmma, dfl - II' dp t~h a' f2" dt, yields a second-order nonlinear differential equation:
~h aZ fl"(P) t~(Tlta).i {-{b~tTl(1-a)) P t Sa S2(P)} ~'(P) -
(nt~)' I(1-s-a) P t S f~(P)} - 0. (5.1)
This equation yields a time-invariant relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the price level.
Note that there are only two lineaz solutions, which correspond exactly to the stable and the unstable arm
of the saddlepath solution of the unrestricted dirty float discussed in section 4. These linear solutions are,
of course, not compatible with the presence of finitely wide nominal exchange rate bands.
To solve for the exchange rate when it is inside the band, it is necessary to specify the nature of
the interventions undertaken by the monetary authorities when the exchange rate reaches the boundaries of
its band. The band on the nominal exchange rate consists of an upper bound (e") and a lower bound (eJ.
The authorities ensure that the exchange rate does not move outside this band by imposing thresholds
p"-fY'(e") and p~-f~'(eJ on the price level (the "fundamental"). We focus only on exchange rate
solutions symmetric about the origin by nortnalizing the central parity to zero and assuming that p"-pc
(so that e"-e~~0). If the price is between p~ and pi,the exchange rate is inside its band and the degree of
monetary accommodazion or intramarginal intervention to price changes is p, while, beyond these
thresholds, the degree of accommodation switches to the one (i.e. I-b) that is needed to keep the exchange
rate fixed at the upper, respectively, lower boundary of its band (see section 4.1). The complete
description of the money supply rule which supports this policy is given by the following piecewise-linearlo
monetary accommodation rule":
tn - PR for p~~p~p~ if05(i~l-S and P~~p~p~ if 1-b~p~l,
m-(I-b)P t Sec, for P2pc if OS(i~l-b and p~~c if 1-b~p~l,
m-(I-b)P t be~, for p5p~ if 05p~1-b and p2p~ if 1-b~j3~l.
(5.2)
Note [hat (5.2) makes use of f2'~0 for OSp~I-b, and Sl'~0 for I-S~Q~1, which correspond to an inverted
and regular S-shaped solution of Sl(.), respectively (see Figure 5(a)). The switch poin[s p"-f2'(e") and
p~-f2''(e~.) follow implicitly from the smooth pasting conditions, which are the appropriate boundary
conditions (cf Miller and Weller, 1990)'s'" If the price level crosses p" (or pJ from the interior of its
band, the nominal interest rate differential, i.e. i-i', jumps from a negative (positive) value to zero. Hence,
the monetary authorities have to implement a discrete contraction (expansion) of the nominal money
supply in order to raise (depress) the interest rate and prevent the exchange rate from moving outside its
band. Because the market anticipates this regime switch at the boundaries of the band, the exchange rate
solution bends and becomes horizontal as the economy approaches the boundaries. This is what is known
as the "honeymoon effect".
6. Reproduction of the stylised psttern ot EMS ezchange rate distributions
6.1. An erplanarionfor the hump-shaped paftern
" This piecewise-linear specification dces not allow intramarginal interventions to depend on how
close the exchange rate is to the edges of the band. Allowing for this complicates the solution without
changing the qualitative features of the analysis much.
" ln Miller and Weller (1991) the band is sustained by infinitesimal adjustments of the money supply
if the exchange rate reaches the boundaries of its band. However, independent of the amount of cumulated
intervention, the exchange rate always returns inside its band if the price movement reverses after
intervention. Tltis intervention policy implies a non-unique relationship between the price level and the
exchange rate, namely one that depends on the current level of money supply. Although the implications
for the unconditional distribution of the exchange rate in its band still need to be worked out further,
Sutherland (1992a) suggests that the distribution is U-shaped rather than hump-shaped. 7tte intuition is
that changes in the money supply, as a result of interventions, temporarily change the long-run equili-
brium consistent with the curtent Ievel of money supply. Ifence, the exchange rate solution in the band
shifts and becomes relatively steep in the middle of the band. Combined with the global mean-reversion
in the price level, this implies a concentration of probability mass near the edges of the band.
'" Although it is not possible to obtain a closed-form expression for alI solutions to differential
equation (5.1), one can characterize the solutions qualitatively (cf Miller and Weller, 1989). It follows
that there is a unique solution in the band which fulfills the smooth pasting conditions (for I-SQi~I this
is guaranteed if ~)`51). For 05(i~l-S the solution is downward sloping and for 1-b~p~l it is upward
sloping. It is stric[iy concave in the upper half of [he band, and strictly convex in the lower half of the
band.In this section we explain how sluggish wagelprice movements and intramarginal interventions
within a nominal exchange rate band combine to offer a potential explanation for the observed hump-
shaped paltcrn of I?MS exchange rate distributions. It is important to undcrstand how the monetary
accommodation ccefficient (ji) and the degree of labour market flexibility (~) affect the shape of the
solution of the exchange rate in terms of the price level and the degree of inean-reversion of the economy.
Let us first investigate how the shape of the exchange rate solution is affected by changes in parameter
values, in particular by the degree of intramarginal accommodation ((i) and the degree of labour market
Flexibility (~).
Figure 5(a) shows, for given ~~0, the exchange rate solution for various degrees of monetary
accommodation (p) within [he band. For a low degree of accommodation, 05p~1-S, fl'~0 and thus p"~p~,
so that the exchange rate solution is an inverted S-shape. 7tte point is that very low prices induce an
expansion of the real money supply and thus a depreciation of the currency, possibly forcing it beyond
the upper bound. For high degrces of accommodation, I-bQi~l, the upper bound e~ translates into an
upper bound on the price level, p~~0, and the exchange rate solution has a regular S-shape. The inward
shift in the LM-curve arising from high prices is now attenuated by accommodation, but the IS-curve
shifix hack a lot. 'Ihe result is :m incipienl inlerest retc differential in favour uf the liireign counlry and
pressure on the currency to depreciate on impact, possibly forcing it outside the band.
Thus, increasing the degree of intramarginal intervention from a low value (OS(i4-S), increases
the gap between the switch points p" and p~, beyond which the exchange rate is pegged at the boundaries
of its band, as the solution for the exchange rate becomes flatter. Titis gap goes to infinity if one
approaches the point at which the exchange rate is pegged (ji-1-b). Increasing the ccefficient of
intramarginal accommodation further, beyond 1-S towards full accommodation, the bandwidth for the
price level again monotonically decreases from infinity. 7iie relationship between the coefficient of
intramarginal accommodation (p) and p"-11''(e") is depicted in Figure 5(b).
Section 4 showed Ihat an increase in labour market flexibility (~) causes the saddlepath to
become more horizontal, i.e. its slope increases when OSp~I-S and its slope decreases when I-b~(i~l.
With a band on the nominal exchange rate, this means that the implied gap between the price limits,
beyond which the exchange rate is held on the boundaries of its band, increases.
Finally, note that both a higher variance (a') and a higher value of the semi-elasticity of the
demand for money with respect to the interest rate (~) induce a stronger honeymoon effect. For a higher
variance, the intuition is that the expected time towards stabilisation of the exchange rate at its boundaries
is shorter. The prospect of future stabilisation strengthens the exchange rate now when it is in the upper
half of its band, and weakens the exchange rate when it is in the lower half of the band. Similarly, a
higher value for l adds to the forward-looking character of the solution and increases the response of the
current spot exchange rate to changes in the expected rate of change in the future (cf. Krugman, 1991).
Hence, the imminent stabilisation at the boundaries of the band has a stronger stabilising effect on the
exchange rate now.12
The extent of inean-reversion of the system is directly affected by the degree of labour market
flexibility. It is therefore instructive to see first what happens in case of complete wage and price rigidity
(i.e. ~-0). Prices then follow a Brownian motion. The reduced fonm equation for the exchange rate has a
similar format as in Krugman (1991):
e-[(ptS-1)ISl P f[(1-(iyb] k t[(qtl)Ibl E,(de)Idt. (6.1)
The band on the exchange rate translates into a band on the fundamental f~[([ifS-I)rS) p t[(1-pyS] lt,
with limits f,-S2''(e~) and t"-f1'(e"). At its boundaries the authorities use infinitesimal adjustments of tt,
while inside the band, for given u, there is intramarginal intervention, which again takes the fortn of
monetary accommodation of price shocks. As a function of the fundamental (f), the solution for the
exchange rate has the familiar S-shape. Hence, for given lt, the exchange rate decreases in the price level
if 05p~1-S and increases in the price level if 1-S~[i~l. However, as Svensson ( 1991a) has shown, a
fundamental which is a Brownian motion (without drift) in its band, is uniformly unconditionally
distributed in its band. Hence, under complete price rigidity (~~), the exchange rate distribution in its
band must be U-shaped. To explain the empirical puale, one thus needs some degree of wage and price
flexibility (i.e. ~~0). It is easy to see that both under a dirty float and under a peg the degree of inean-
reversion increases in ~, because the (negative) root of the reduced form system [equations (4.2) and
(4.3), respectively (4.7)], which detennines the expeaed speed of the economy ta its long-run equilibrium,
decreases in ~. However, to see how the degree of inean-reversion is affected by a change in labour
market flexibility (~) if there is a band on the nominal exchange rate, the nonlinearity of the exchange
rate solution forces us to resort to Monte-Carlo simulations.
6.1. Monte-Carlo simulation resu(rs
Because we do not have analytical closed-fortn solutions for the unconditional exchange rate
distributions when there is a band on the exchange rate, we use Monte Carlo simulations to reproduce the
hump-shaped pattem of the EMS exchange rate distributions. Details about the simulation procedure are
available upon request. The choice of parametervalues is determined by the considerations outlined above.
Given the variance (a'), which determines the overall variability of the system, one needs an
accommodation ccefficient ([i) which is close enough to I-S, and at the same time a degree of labour
market flexibility (SS) which is not too small. Various experiments suggest that there is a wide range of
parameter values consistent with a hump-shaped pattem of the exchange rate distribution. Moreover, we
conjecture that for a given degree of labour market flexibility (~~0), it is always possible to choose p so
close to I-S, that the implied bandwidth for the price level (i.e. the gap between p,, and p") becomes so
large that the percentage of time that the exchange rate is at its boundaries is negligible. In our simula-
tions reported here we have set a~.I, q-S-l-~h. We also assume a symmetric exchange rate band of13
t2.25"~0, which is the bandwidth of EMS exchange rates".
Figure 6 portrays simulated distributions" of the nominal exchange rate. In the cases of no
intramarginal intervention (see Figure 6(a); p~, m~.5) and almost full accommodation (see Figure 6(b);
a-0.98, ~-0.5), the gap between the switch points pi and p" is relatively small, so that the exchange rate
distribution is U-shaped. However, if (3 is close to 1-S, the combination of a large gap betwcen p, and p"
and the mean-reversion induced by the (sluggish) wagelprice response to excess demandlsupply, leads to
an exchange ra[e distribution which is hump-shaped (see Figure 6(c); (i~.46, ~~.5). As expected, the
hump-shaped pattem is more pronounced for the higher degree of labour market flexibility. In the case
where ~-1 and (f-0.46 (see Figure 6(d)), the simulated distribution clearly resembles the empirical
distribution of the DFlIDM rate giving support for the view that De Nederlandsche Bank engages in a fair
amount of intramarginal interventions az well as trying to keep the guilder inside its band.
Figures 7 shows simulated unconditional distributions of the interest rate differential for the same
combinations of (i and ~. When the degree of intramarginal accommodation is far from 1-S, the exchange
rate spends a relatívely large part of the time on the boundaries of the band where the interest rate
differential is zero. This explains the sharp contrast between [he amoun[ of probability mass in the middle
clazs of the histograms and the other classes, when (i~ and (i~.98. When ji is close to 1-S, the
distribution has a hump-shaped pattem, which becomes more concentrated around zero if goods and
labour markets are more flexible. In fact, the empirical distributions of the interest differentials in the
EMS generally also have a hump-shaped character.
7. Concluding remarks
Following Bertola and Caballero (1992), we have provided additional evidence of an empirical
puazle conceming EMS exchange rates, namely that the stylised pattem of their empirical distributions
tends to be hump-shaped rather than U-shaped, as predided by the standard target zone model. Our
evidence is based on the subperiod April 1983 - November 1991 for the Dutch guilder and the subperiod
February 1987 - November 1991 for the other exchange rates egainst the Deutsche Mark. During these
periods the EMS exchange rates were relatively credible, as may be wimessed from the interest rate
differentials. Nence, for this period, the explanation offered by Bertola and Caballero (1992) seems less
appropriate as i[ is based on expectations of repeated realignments. We have offered an altemative
explanation which is valid even when there is no probability of realignment. Our explanation is based on
the combination of two realistic features, namely that wages and prices are not fully flexible and that
there are intramarginal interventions.
" Except for the Italian lira before 8 January 1990, when the bandwidth was t6"~o.
" The reason why we present the simulated distributions as histograms, is that they have a mixed
discrete-continuous nature, because in the long-run distribution there is a positive probability that the
exchange rate is exactly located on its boundaries. Of course, for p"close to 1-S", the relative amount of
time spent at the boundaries of the band is negligible.14
As shown by the interest rate differentials with Germany, the credibility of the exchange rate
bands haz increased a lot during the more recent EMS period under consideration. Although close to aero
on average, interest rate differentials were still positive. Moreover, there still seemed to be some noise in
the relationship between the position of the exchange rate in the band and the interest rate differential,
which may indicate a slight residual (stochastic) devaluation risk. Hence, future research may combine the
expectations of realignments stressed by Bertola and Caballero (1992) with the combined effects of price
sluggishness and intramarginal interventions. This extension may benefit from recent work by Svensson
(1991a,b) and Bertola and Svensson (1993). Such a richer framework will help to understand the hump-
shaped pattern of exchange rate distributions during earlier periods in the EMS and the more recent period
we studied, as well az the very recent speculative attacks on the Italian lira and the British pound that
forced these currencies to leave the EMS.
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